|
''The resignation
of seven parliamentarians from the UK’s opposition Labour party is more
than a symptom of political instability on the eve of Brexit.
It illustrates that the nation’s party political system is fragmenting in response to political, economic and social pressures in similar ways to the party systems of continental Europe.
What
a delicious irony that, as the UK prepares to quit the EU on March 29,
its political trends, and the social conditions and ideological battles
that produce them, are as European as ever...
We can amplify this point. Just as the UK’s political splits are making it extremely hard to forge a consensus
behind a Brexit plan, so the divisions in continental politics are
making it difficult for mainstream European parties to unite behind
efforts to rejuvenate and strengthen the EU...''
The similarities begin with the emergence
of new types of hard-right and hard-left groups on the British and
continental political spectra. Traditional moderate parties of the
centre-left and centre-right are “out of touch with the realities of
social change”, as Bryan Magee, a philosopher and former Labour MP, puts it.
Just
as Germany’s Social Democrats, France’s Socialists and other
centre-left parties are in retreat, so the UK Labour party is losing its
grip on what was once a winning electoral coalition of urban liberals
and the industrial working class. Wealth, educational and regional
differences are dividing electorates in the UK as in EU countries.
Labour’s relative success in the 2017 national election disguised these difficulties.
But they have become more acute because of the party machinery’s
capture by Jeremy Corbyn, Labour’s leader, and his cabal of supporters
from the communist tradition.
To
this should be added the poison of anti-Semitism, which has spread in
the Labour party under Mr Corbyn. In recent years anti-Semitism has
emerged as a feature of anti-parliamentarian continental politics, as
was underlined last weekend during the latest gilets jaunes (“yellow vests”) protests in France.
At
the time of the 2016 British referendum on EU membership, the nation’s
most dynamic, militant rightwing movement was the UK Independence party.
Ukip’s hostility to the EU and emphasis on national sovereignty gave it
a passing resemblance to France’s National Front (renamed last year as National Rally) and the Dutch PVV.
At
heart, however, Ukip was a deformation of the British Conservative
party’s rightwing. Recently this has changed in a fundamental way. Ukip
has swung
in a far-right, anti-Islamic direction, such that it looks less like a
political party than a movement such as Pegida (“Patriotic Europeans
Against the Islamisation of the West”), the extremist group based in
eastern Germany.
The
leading rightwing nationalist force in British politics today is a
faction of Prime Minister Theresa May’s Conservatives that calls itself
the European Reform Group. As columnist Nick Cohen observes, this faction operates in the House of Commons “as a separate English nationalist party”.
In
its intransigence and cultivation of a slightly eccentric public image,
the European Reform Group shares features with Eurosceptic,
anti-establishment elements of Italy’s ruling League party, led by Matteo Salvini.
Like the League, the British faction has connections to influential
business and financial interests. However, its political message,
although obdurately anti-EU, is less virulently anti-immigrant than the
League’s.
In
the UK and continental Europe, moderate politicians like those who quit
Labour on Monday are struggling to regain influence. On both sides of
the Channel, still bigger battles lie ahead.
No comments:
Post a Comment